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This policy brief draws on the findings of a research 
project that explored and interrogated the language 
used in connection to violence, paramilitarism and the 
law in Northern Ireland. It identifies the ways by which 
terminology continues to convey distinct and conflicting 
understandings of goals, methods and measurement 
relating to lawfulness; and looks to establish, with greater 
clarity, the possibilities for shared language around 
issues connected with violence and the rule of law. The 
evidence is drawn from seven focus groups with serving 
PSNI officers; ex-combatants from both Loyalist and 
Republican communities; young people; representatives 
of civil society, and four interviews with members of both 
online and print media conducted in 2017. 
The deep roots of political and community division in 
Northern Ireland society have been directly reflected 
in differences over language, most acutely in relation 
to the use of violence and the enforcement of the rule 
of law. Division has been both political and moral, and 
the language chosen has often been similarly deliberate 
and partisan, designed to convey specific moral and 
political meanings surrounding force and language. The 
recent NI Executive response1 to the Paramilitary Panel2 
recommendations in 2016 set out a series of actions to 
address the negative and harmful impact of the culture 
of paramilitarism within and between communities. In 
practice, the panel acknowledged that 22 years after the 
ceasefires the influence of paramilitarism remains a lived 
reality for many people. The primary goal of that Action 
Plan was to plot a pathway towards establishing a culture 
of lawfulness and eroding any residual support for action 
outside the rule of law. 
However, any agreement on a new approach to 
‘paramilitarism’ leading to a definitive end to all tolerance 
of extra-legal activity, inevitably surfaces the need for 
shared terminology and language to ensure coherent 
processes, goals and monitoring. In practice, many of our 
terms (conflict, war, prisoner, combatant, victim, dissident, 
paramilitary, terrorist, brigadier, security situation, 
organised crime, Loyalist, republican, punishment) 
remain laden with different meaning and expectations in 
various communities and settings, and continue to reflect 
assumptions rooted in conflict rather than lawfulness. 
This perpetuates not only words but also embedded 
and divergent attitudes and behaviours. Therefore, it is 
crucial that society has a common understanding of what 
terms and words mean, and recognises the sensitivities 
and potential impact of using an old language in a new 
political setting.  
Introduction The context
1. https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/publications/tackling-paramilitary-activity-criminality-and-organised-crime-executive-action-plan 
2. https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/publications/fresh-start-panel-report-disbandment-paramilitary-groups-northern-ireland
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3Overall, the analysis of the data suggests that large 
sections of society continue to rely upon ‘words, 
terms and phrases’ derived from the 1970s and 80s 
when talking about current behaviours and activities. 
Furthermore, our collective inability to reach any 
consensus on historical events has meant that our 
language conveys only partially hidden meanings 
that inevitably antagonise various constituencies and 
reinforce division in the present. The key findings note the 
following: 
1.  Currently, language that refers to violence outside 
the law, language about the use of legal force, and 
terms around protagonists remains heavily influenced 
by approaches to conflict that were normalised 
prior to 1998. In contrast, the modern language of 
international terrorism and political violence such 
as ‘radicalisation, extremism and violent extremism’ 
is not commonly applied to Northern Ireland, even 
though the local behaviours and activities fit the 
recognised definitions. 
2.  Prior to the ceasefires in 1994 and the Belfast/Good 
Friday Agreement (the Agreement) in 1998, a number 
of organisations claimed direct political or community 
legitimacy for their use of violence and choice of 
targets. While legitimacy was always strongly resisted 
in domestic or international law, there was also 
regular evidence of embedded community support for 
elements of this narrative. Many formally or informally 
acceded to the view of the violence being a ‘conflict’ 
or ‘war’, where violence was justified or explicable in 
terms of unusual circumstances, rather than ‘terrorism’ 
or ‘criminality’. The language of ‘ceasefires’ and ‘talks’ 
tended to support this narrative of conflict, not crime. 
Since 1998, describing the period between 1969 and 
1998 as ‘the conflict’ stemming from this analysis has 
become almost orthodox in many circles and now 
appears to go largely unchallenged in public discourse.
3.  There was an overwhelming sense that the 
transformation to a society based exclusively on 
the rule of law remains incomplete. The willingness 
to provide cover for change which has not been 
completed, appears to have led to a degree of 
cynicism about all language associated with this area 
of conflict transformation. For example, the prison 
system continues to support a form of special status 
for some prisoners claiming political motivation. 
Furthermore, the term ‘political prisoner’ has become 
embedded within society and rarely challenged. The 
culture of some neighbourhoods appears to tolerate, 
or at least normalise, the presence of organised groups 
using violence, and processes continue to exist that 
verify and indirectly legitimise paramilitary threats 
and intimidation. In addition, the media appear to 
constantly change their description of individuals, 
especially in relation to the past i.e. heroes and villains 
can often be the same person, paramilitaries at night 
and community leaders/activists during the day. It was 
felt that this process has gone so far in Northern Ireland 
that all words have become suspect and there is no 
person/organisation with the authority and capacity to 
enforce consistency. Inevitably, this means that it can 
be impossible for some individuals to have a future if 
they are consistently being framed by their historical 
actions and behaviours. 
Observations 
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4.  Since 1998 the vast majority of those who had supported 
the use of violence also signed up to the Agreement and 
its central requirement that only democratic means were 
legitimate in relation to political disagreement. Indeed, 
this was a prior condition for qualification for early 
release from prison. In theory, at least, the Agreement 
was an absolute watershed in relation to violence in 
politics in Northern Ireland. Anyone subsequently using, 
threatening or legitimising violence for political means 
is by definition outside the framework that was agreed 
by signatory governments, international supporters 
and all significant political parties in Northern Ireland, 
as well as being explicitly and unambiguously agreed 
to by the ‘former’ paramilitary organisations and their 
members themselves. All violence, whether for political 
ends or for non-political ends, is by definition crime. 
 
However, in practice this unambiguous political, legal 
and diplomatic change has NOT been translated 
into the everyday language or speech of politicians, 
governments, communities or media. The political 
preference in Northern Ireland since the Belfast 
Agreement was for gradualism and negotiated change 
rather than confrontation and enforcement as the route 
to effective transformation. Yet twenty years on, the 
language of paramilitaries and violent action appears 
still continuous with the pre-1998 era. No linguistic 
or status watershed is visible. Although the language 
of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ is less frequently applied, 
organisations claiming continuity with campaigns in the 
past continue to be routinely referred to as ‘loyalist’, 
‘republican’, ‘paramilitary’ or ‘dissident’ when they use 
violence, implying a continuing tradition, in which the 
commitment to purely political means was somehow 
qualified, temporary, individual or ambivalent.
5.  Prior to 1998, the role of the state was openly 
contested in daily political discourse in Northern 
Ireland. This disjunction between formal official 
language and terms in common use was reflected in 
the media, where terms could and were sometimes 
used interchangeably or loosely at times. As a result, 
every term around legitimacy was contested at popular 
level including troubles/conflict/war and terrorism/ 
paramilitarism/soldier. The role of the army and 
security forces was also directly contested in politics. 
 
In 1998, those parties that signed the Good Friday 
Agreement made a “total and absolute commitment 
to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of 
resolving differences on political issues, and our 
opposition to any use or threat of force by others 
for any political purpose, whether in regard to this 
agreement or otherwise.” This political watershed, and 
the practical steps which resulted from it, represented 
the formal end of any residual political tolerance for 
violence and a new consensus on constitutional means. 
 
However, while there is a very broad political consensus 
that all subsequent violence had no legitimacy, the 
issue of violence in the past and what constituted 
legitimacy in the pursuit of political causes remains 
contentious to say the least.  In 2018, this has led to a 
very high degree of public sensitivity about language, 
which is designed to protect political approaches 
to violence in the past (and momentum in the peace 
process) and this political imperative has continued 
to impact on approaches to contemporary language. 
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5There does not appear to be any agreement on who is 
meant by many terms: there are occasions when people 
argue that a loyalist paramilitary was an honourable 
term for a specific type of fighter, while others contend 
that Republicans were not paramilitaries but soldiers, 
equivalent to British soldiers. Still others maintain 
that all were a form of terrorism. Defining exactly who 
is meant by ‘paramilitaries’, who is eligible or should 
be supported for change and what kind of change is 
expected of people and communities will be important 
for any policy of intervention. Does policy to address 
paramilitarism apply to those engaged in terrorist 
activities, or simply those that maintain power through 
crime and community coercion? The absence of clarity 
and consistency leads to ambiguity and confusion 
around what exactly government policy is in relation to 
violence and armed groups. 
6.  The ‘peace process’ has proceeded for over twenty 
years without any process on what is euphemistically 
but universally referred to as ‘the past’ – violence 
and its consequences between 1969 and 1998. 
Each political party and their constituency have their 
own clear approach to this issue, but it has proved 
impossible to make progress towards a societal 
consensus. Political groups and movements appear 
to insist on respect for their own actions or to defend 
those of their ‘side’, and on condemnation of violence 
by the other ‘side’. All political parties have so far 
failed to develop agreed and consistent language 
about violence in the present, which continues to 
hinder their ability to address issues of the past. 
 
Political and community groups remain highly 
sensitive to anything which appears to decisively 
define a public approach to violence in this period 
i.e. recasting paramilitary or dissident action in the 
form of ‘punishment’ assaults and shootings as child 
abuse; or attacks on the PSNI as attempted murder. 
In seeking to avoid disagreements over the legitimacy 
of past violence impacting on political progress, there 
appears to have been an informal political consensus 
to accept that this issue cannot be resolved. Each party 
actively adopts contradictory narratives and language 
about past violence, thereby fuelling ambiguity about 
aspects of violence in the present. The signals coming 
from politics about ‘paramilitarism’, ‘punishment’ and 
‘intimidation’ has remained inconsistent, partisan and 
ambiguous, and the appetite to directly confront it 
appears weak. There has been no clear programme of 
decisive action to resolve this linguistic ambiguity, nor 
any clear pathway on how this might be achieved.
7.  In spite of the Agreement and peace process, public 
language continues to reflect deeply embedded partisan 
commitments. Great variation in meaning around 
words is evident, and each political/community group 
continues to define their own legitimacy framework. 
There does not appear to have been a serious political 
effort to close this loop since 1998.  As a consequence, 
there is no consistent or uniform message about the 
legitimacy of certain types of violence, and some aspects 
appear to be treated as ‘distinct’ from crime in the 
normal sense. This makes language for measurement 
of progress difficult, as the nature of ‘progress’ is itself 
contested, creating significant challenges for policies 
such as a ‘Fresh Start3’. As a result, the media use 
language in relation to communities loosely and without 
any agreed or established framework. 
3. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start-for-northern-ireland
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8.  Young people growing up since the Agreement appear 
to have adopted some of the language of the past 
while at the same time there is evidence that they no 
longer identify with its content. Accordingly, simplified 
narratives of the past are accepted, including received 
political narratives about paramilitaries, conflict and the 
necessity of political struggle. As a result, much of this 
is taken for granted.  At the same time there is evidence 
that young people regard aspects of the behaviour of 
paramilitaries and violent dissidents (assuming they 
are different to paramilitaries) as essentially linked to 
criminality and community control rather than politics 
and ideological positions. One of the most telling 
insights is that discussions around terrorism, radicalism 
and extremism are associated with contemporary 
international politics rather than Northern Irish affairs. 
9.  The language around enforcement remains contested 
and public confidence in the ability of the state to 
enforce the rule of law around some issues appears 
to be fragile. Historically, the PSNI has been keen to 
avoid enforcement ‘against’ a community, seeking 
instead to act ‘in support of’ a community. However, 
the police continue to be treated as outsiders in some 
areas and what was once assumed to be a path to 
increased public confidence in the organisation has 
failed in some areas. Within particular communities 
there is ambiguity around the concept of the rule of 
law, and competing views on who has responsibility 
for addressing community concerns around criminality 
and public disorder. 
10.  There is no definition of paramilitarism, and in 2018 
many sections of society continues to be wedded to 
terms such as ‘brigadier, company, and unit’ and often 
views their behaviours and actions through the lens of 
a balaclava and gun. Yet the evidence suggests that 
current day paramilitarism is much more complex. 
Furthermore, words such as ‘terrorist, paramilitary 
and organised criminal’ are used interchangeably, 
without clearly identifying what is meant. Although 
both the context and environment are different society 
remains constricted by its historical understanding of 
why these organisations exist. There is a danger that 
applying the conflict language twenty years after the 
Agreement provides both a rationale and legitimacy 
for their actions. 
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7Following the analysis it became apparent that there 
were several areas of consideration that may address the 
language conundrum of the peace process: 
a. The goal of the Agreement was to remove all residual 
glamour, continuity and legitimacy from violence. 
However, this has not been uniformly achieved and it is 
not clear that unilateral action by one ‘party’ can resolve 
this. There is a need to stimulate civic as well as political 
discussions about what language is appropriate in relation 
to the contentious elements of violence. The creation of 
a shared ethical framework might create consistency and 
mutual accountability moving forward. 
b. Adhering to the rule of law means that justification 
for violence or enforcement outside the law has been 
removed. New language describing violence should 
privilege the victim over the perpetrator and remove any 
justification for the act. The essential measure of change 
is from language, which is focussed on motive (cause or 
purpose), to language, which emphasises consequence 
i.e. from punishment to injury, from war to crime or from 
rationale to trauma.  
c. Government policy dealing with post-conflict issues, 
above all ‘Fresh Start’ and ‘Together: Building a United 
Community’ needs clear terms and definitions through 
which its purpose, areas of activity and outcomes can 
be measured. All activity must be explicitly aimed at 
underpinning the unconditional commitment of all parties 
in Northern Ireland to the rule of law. Failure to establish 
and apply clear terms will fuel cynicism and undermine 
the credibility of new programmes and initiatives. 
d. Unless all parties sign up to a clarification of terms, 
the unmistakable prospect is of the continuity of partisan 
language, ambiguity and inconsistency. There is no 
prospect of government successfully enforcing language 
without wider consensus and participation in the process, 
but the research suggests that failure to clarify terms 
is continuing a spurious legitimacy for organisations 
shaped by violence, by affording it a continuing political 
motivation. 
e. Under the work of the Independent Reporting 
Commission there may be an opportunity to explore the 
role and function of language in relation to conflict issues, 
especially around measuring interventions to disband 
paramilitarism. 
f. Thought should be given to the development of a 
linguistic campaign with a number of dimensions:
–  There should be a clear public strategy of transition, 
which is removing the legitimacy from violence and 
removing words such as paramilitary or punishment 
beating from normalised vocabulary. This should divide 
between legitimate behaviour and organised crime or 
gangsterism. This should be fronted by all of the political 
parties, statutory agencies and the wider criminal justice 
system;
–  A shared ethical framework for engagement should be 
established and applied to all agencies, including the 
police;
–  Behaviours such as attacks on children and the 
person should be referred to by criminal names in 
communications;
–  The flag of convenience around paramilitarism or 
paramilitary-style should be avoided in communications. 
Recommendations
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